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The focus of this article is on the ways in which emotions are engaged in the discursive
construction and treatment of disabled people in receipt of social security benefits. The
article draws upon the literature related to the social importance of emotions and that
concerned with moral boundary drawing. It argues that the evocation of emotional
reactions is crucial in understanding the ways in which changes to out-of-work benefits for
disabled people (the development of Employment and Support Allowance) have recently
been effected and the ways in which this has reflected a desire to more closely denote
those judged able and not able to work in a redrawing of the ‘disability category’. While
this has been done in the name of ‘inclusion’, the article concludes that its consequences
are, in various ways, the ‘exclusion’ and stigmatisation of disabled people.
Keywords: Disabled people, emotions, exclusion, inclusion, social security.
I n t roduct ion
Britain has had specific social security benefits for disabled people since invalidity benefit
was introduced as part of the National Insurance Act 1971. However, in the past decade
there have been concerted efforts to reign in the financial support that is expended on
such people, particularly the monies expended upon those of working age. In many
senses, this attempt to reduce expenditure on disabled people reflects what Drakeford
(1998: 563) describes as a ‘deep perversity’ in British social security policy (that when
the number of people receiving benefits increases governments attack the benefit system,
rather than congratulating themselves). It also reflects, however, Eger’s (2010) observation
that where ‘out groups’ are perceived to be increasing, the public is less likely to be in
favour of financial support for them.
This article is not concerned with the detail of policy change. The facts, for example,
that disabled people are being impoverished by recent changes, such as the replacement
of Incapacity Benefit (IB) by Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), and that the
latter’s Work Capability Assessment (WCA) is deeply problematic, are well established
(see, for example, Messere and Stenger, 2007; Puttick, 2007; Grover and Piggott, 2010;
Macmillan, 2010; Mind, 2010; NACAB, 2010; Beatty and Fothergill, 2011). In contrast,
this article is concerned with broader issues related to how the process of developing
ESA was framed through cultural understandings of chronic sickness and disability. The
article’s approach is consistent with arguments that suggest language is important in
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effecting social change and producing authority (Fairclough, 1992; Rose et al., 2006) and
with the literature concerned, to various degrees, with the representation of social policy
and the recipients of its benefits and services, especially disabled recipients (for example,
Ginsburg, 1979; Golding and Middleton, 1982; Golding, 1999; Kemp, 2000; Piggott
and Grover, 2009; Soldatic and Pini, 2009; Garthwaite, 2011; Soldatic and Meekosha,
2012). In particular, drawing upon literature concerned with emotions and their place
in the moral ordering of societies, we focus upon the way in which the boundaries of
worklessness and their relationship to the ‘disability category’ (Stone, 1984) are being
redrawn in late modern social security policy and the ways in which these relate to the
‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ of disabled people.
Media ted d iscourses and benefits fo r d isab led peop le
The tradition in social policy analyses, particularly in the Fabian tradition, has been to
argue that change in policy comes from various economic and social factors, framed by
political motives and concerns, and the institutional concerns of welfare state agencies. In
this sense, social policy, while being linked to broad issues (for example, the nature of the
economy, social change and so forth), has been regarded as a rather narrow technocratic
area of concern, but one that is ultimately framed by (an albeit politically mediated)
rationality: that, for example, the provision of evidence of economic and social harm
will lead to change for the better. Even when there is retrenchment in policy, as Britain is
facing at the moment, such an approach dominates, and is in many senses seen as being
even more urgent.
Such an approach, however, limits the scope of analysis and denies what some have
hinted at or have argued for a long time: that social policy is an emotive issue framed by
emotional concerns and reactions. In other words, social policies are as much related to
emotions, such as anger, contempt, disgust, shame and sympathy, as they are, for instance,
to the state of the economy. Golding and Middleton’s (1982) account of concerns with
social security ‘scrounging’ in the 1970s and its role in managing unemployment, through
to Kemp’s (2000: 267) argument that the first ‘new’ Labour government ‘found it difficult
to construct a ‘convincing story’ to justify large-scale cuts in social security’, to Piggott
and Grover’s (2009) location of the introduction of the ESA in ‘scroungerphobia’ − all
suggest this. This is because, from the state’s point of view, successful policy change in
late modern society has to be located in the representational, the cultural, if it is to be
successful.
Golding and Middleton (1982: 236) argue that the media are ‘implicated in social
policy on at least two levels’. First, ‘they frame public debate, advancing priorities
and a sense of issues in a way that media researchers have labelled “agenda setting”’
and, second, ‘the expectations, mythologies, stereotypes and elisions of media creation
influence the day-to-day administration of policy’ (ibid.). Hancock’s (2004) focus upon
the social construction of ‘welfare queens’ in the USA reflects these themes that connect
the media to social policy. She argues that the public identity of social groups constructed
through media imagery are reinforced by government policies, especially their social
policies. Her work suggests a two-way process – that public identity affects policy and
policy affects public identity. These can be mutually reinforcing and in an emotionally
charged political context can create gross error in beliefs among citizens about people
who receive state organised financial support. This is because the ‘cueing of public
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identity by political elites or the news media involves two distinct cognitive behaviours;
the assignment of specific traits and behaviours to an individual, and moral judgements
based on the explanations for said traits or behaviours’ (Hancock, 2004: 16).
It is certainly the case that media representations of welfare issues appear in a
number of guises. The media variously exposes government policies as an attack on
welfare recipients, mounts its own attacks on such people and/or mirrors the arguments
of government policy. However, in Britain recent news media reporting of disabled people
has become increasingly vitriolic through what Garthwaite (2011: 369) describes as the
‘language of shirkers and scroungers’. So, for example, Briant et al. (2011: 4) found that
between 2004/05 and 2010/11 there had been a:
reduction in the proportion of articles [in The Sun, The Mirror, The Express, The Mail and The
Guardian] which describe disabled people in sympathetic and deserving terms, and stories that
document the ‘real life’ experiences of living as a disabled person [had] also decreased.
By the latter period, claims of ‘undeservingness’ in the news media were most likely
to be attributed to journalists, followed by politicians and, particularly in the tabloids,
the public. It would appear that in parts of the British media, welfare fraud has become
‘welfare as fraud’ (Chunn and Gavigan, 2004), particularly in relation to disabled people.
Briant et al. (2011: 4), for example, found in their research that: ‘When the focus groups
were asked to describe a typical story in the newspapers on disability benefit, fraud was
the most popular theme mentioned.’
Of course, the idea that the media should be any more sympathetic to disabled
people than it is to able-bodied people needs to be avoided as it might result in equally
problematic constructions of the former as being pitiable (cf. Barnes, 1992; Shakespeare,
1994). However, it is important to understand the ways in which the changing
representation of disabled people can have material expressions and consequences. In
the context of Briant et al.’s (2011) research, it would seem that there is little coincidence
that a report commissioned by the voluntary sector organisation, SCOPE, in 2011 found
that:
37% of people with disabilities claimed they were increasingly being abused on the streets,
erroneously reported to the benefits fraud hotline and accosted when trying to use disabled
parking spaces. Nearly two thirds thought others did not believe that they were disabled and
half of respondents said they felt others presumed they did not work. (Reported in TheGuardian,
15 May 2011)
There are a limited number of ways in which people gain the knowledge that informs
such hostilities towards disabled people. It may come from experience. People may know
(or, more likely, they think they know) first hand or through others, someone who is
claiming benefits for disabled people when they appear well or able-bodied enough not
to require those benefits. However, it may also be the case that such actions are the
consequence of a powerful set of discourses that in recent years have come to stigmatise
disabled people as receiving unwarranted, overly generous and easily exploited state
organised financial support (see Briant et al., 2011; Garthwaite, 2011). The parliamentary
Work and Pensions Committee (2011: 3), for instance, recently blamed the media for
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representing reforms of IB as an attack on disabled people, ‘as some sort of scheme to
“weed out benefit cheats”’, rather than as a means of helping them back to work.
The Committee also warned the government not to use language that would support
the belief that disabled claimants were workshy.1 The government’s position was that it
had in no way encouraged the media to use pejorative language in their descriptions of
disabled people and disability benefits (see comments of Chris Grayling, then Minister
for Employment, ibid., question 254). However, the Work and Pensions Committee was
not particularly convinced by this argument, noting that:
more care is needed in the way the Government engages with the media and in particular the
way in which it releases and provides its commentary on official statistics on the IB reassessment
. . . the Government should take great care with the language itself uses and take all possible
steps to ensure that context is provided when information about IB claimants found fit for work
is released, so that unhelpful and inaccurate stories can be shown to have no basis. (2011: 15)
The fact that the government had to be told this is indicative of the nature of much
media coverage afforded to disabled people. Indeed, themedia coverage of benefit receipt
among such people, and its alleged associationwith abuse and fraud, has recently become
so pervasive and stigmatising that the voluntary organisation, Mind, has felt it necessary to
launch The Daily Stigma ‘to fight back against benefits stigma and an unfair and ineffective
welfare system for people with mental health problems’.2
In many senses, the concerns of the Work and Pensions Committee (2011) noted
above point to the ways in which media and policy discourses conjoin in the
condemnation of disabled people who depend on state-organised benefits. Discourses
of ‘benefit dependency’ (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2010: para. 1.100) and ‘welfare
dependency’ (ibid.: para. 1.54), for example, have increasingly framed social security
policy for disabled people (Garthwaite, 2011). Such discourses are ‘imbued with meaning
of a cultural and particularly moral kind’ (Haylett, 2001: 361). As such, they have
contributed to the juxtapositioning of binaries (in work/workless, independent/dependent,
responsible/irresponsible) that have helped provide a moral case for changes to social
security policy as both media and policy discourses suggest benefits for disabled people
trap them in the negative of these binaries.
In this section, it has been argued that the representation of social security policy
for out-of-work disabled people has been important in constructing the case for change.
The next issue that we need to address is why this is the case. Our focus is upon the
emotionality of such discourses, for, as Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) argue, emotions are
social phenomena that are constituted through discourses.
L ink ing the emot iona l and mater ia l
Thornicroft et al. (2007: 194) argue that the rejection of a minority group by a majority
group ‘usually involve[s] not just negative thoughts but also emotions such as anxiety,
anger, resentment, hostility, distaste or disgust’. Emotions play an important role in the
othering of people in a process of what Sayer (2005: 952–3) describes as ‘moral boundary
drawing’, the ‘way in which social groups often distinguish themselves from others in
terms of moral differences, claiming for themselves certain virtues which others are held
to lack . . . we are hard-working, they are lazy, and so on’. Moral boundary drawing is
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important because of its role in constructing social order. Rozin et al. (1999: 574–5),
for example, argue that the ‘self-conscious emotions’, shame, embarrassment and guilt,
‘involve ongoing assessments of the moral worth and fit of the individual self within
a community. These emotions motivate the individual to want to fit in, to behave in a
culturally acceptable fashion, and to avoid harming people.’ A ‘second cluster of moral
emotions reflects a similar concern for the integrity of social order, but now turned outward
to others. Contempt, anger and disgust . . . are . . . moral emotions, a cluster of related . . .
emotional reactions to the moral violations of others’ (ibid.: 575). It is the latter cluster
of emotions, what Izard (1977: 340) described as the ‘hostility triad’, that is of particular
interest to us in this section, as it is arguably the case that political and media discourses
often, as we have seen, elicit feelings of hostility towards disabled people (Briant et al.,
2011).
The idea of the ‘hostility triad’ demonstrates how difficult it is to disaggregate the
emotions (see Rozin et al., 1999). The disgusting, for example, is also likely to make one
feel anger or contempt. So, for example, the newspaper headline ‘Anger As Disability
Benefit Claimants Soar By One Million’, of an article that claimed ‘19,400 alcoholics
and drug addicts claim the mobility component of DLA’ (The Express, 4 June 2011) is
designed to cause an emotional response on various levels: for instance, disgust that such
‘undeserving’ people as illicit and licit substance misusers can claim benefits that are
supposed to be for the ‘genuinely’ disabled, contempt for those people who are making
such claims and anger that the benefit regime allows them to do so. Hence, while the
disgust emotion is the one that is held to be ‘especially useful and necessary as a builder
of moral and social community’ (Miller, 1997: 194), it is often accompanied by the other
emotions, anger and contempt, in the ‘hostility triad’.
There is increasing interest in the socio-moral, interpersonal and clinical aspects of
disgust (Olatunji and Sawchuk, 2005). Just as Sayer (2005) argues about shame, disgust
responses have powerful effects on the social and personal identity of those judged to
be less capable, less attractive and less disciplined than they are themselves. Vartanian
(2010), for example, suggests that negative attitudes towards obese people are based on a
disgust response to people who are seen as lacking in self control, while Hutcherson and
Gross (2011) claim that disgust is related to judgements about the moral trustworthiness
of individuals. However, to consider disgust just as an emotional response is problematic,
because to do so would ignore its material consequences. Sherman and Haidt (2011),
for instance, conclude that disgust can lead to dehumanisation, which, in turn, can give
credence to a belief that individuals and groups can justifiably be treated differently.
Hutcherson and Gross (2011), for example, argue that those adjudged through disgust
emotions to be untrustworthy are avoided or excluded.
Such ideas reflect Nussbaum’s (2004) analysis that income poor people are shunned,
shamed and treated as idle and of low worth. In this context, disgust is utilised as
a normative pointer and as such has been used throughout history to exclude and
marginalise groups or individual people. This is because an appearance of control is
purchased by the creation of sub-groups, that come to exemplify various economic,
moral and social threats, constructed through disgust. Nussbaum maintains that disgust
is an emotion that is expressed through the subordination of both individuals and groups
on the basis of features of their way of life and, therefore, is an emotion that should
have no place in the administrative functions of liberal societies. The concern with moral
threat is repeated in some readings of ‘underclass’ and communitarianism (for example,
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Murray, 1990, 1994; Etzioni, 1995; for discussion, Deacon, 2002) that either explicitly or
implicitly deal with the ways in which the ‘respectable’ may become contaminated by the
‘irresponsible’ and ‘feckless’, and in which social control is threatened by individuals and
groups that are perceived as threatening, as able to contaminate moral and civil virtues.
What can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the ways in which societies
are structured are closely linked to moral judgements about individuals and social groups.
Privilege and power are defended through discursive, as well as economic, means. The
evocation of hostile emotions, particularly disgust, attributes ‘power and danger to the
pollutant, then creates remedies to protect the social order from becoming polluted’
(Lynch, 2002: 539). In other words, disgust as part of the ‘hostility triad’, can inform social
classification and hierarchies (Miller, 1997; Hancock, 2004; Lawler, 2005; Nussbaum,
2004; Tyler, 2008). In the following section, these observations are related to the redrawing
of the ‘disability category’ through the ESA and its role in reducing the number of people
defined as being incapable of working.
Disgus t , the ‘d i sab i l i t y ca tegory ’ and tens ions o f ‘ i nc lus ion ’
So far this article has argued that disabled people are represented in popular discourses
in ways to evoke disgust, and we have seen that the state has been indicated as part of this
problem through the relationships between the media and social policy. There is a tension,
however, in that the official documents explaining the introduction and development of
ESA firmly located it in a discourse related to social ‘inclusion’. So, for example, for ‘new’
Labour ESA was said to be an approach aimed at ‘achieving equality for disabled people’
(Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 2008: 7), while we are told by the Coalition
government that it ‘is absolutely committed to supporting disabled people to participate
fully in society, including remaining in or returning to work whenever feasible’ (Secretary
of State for Work and Pensions, 2010: 18).
There is an obvious disjuncture here between the discourses related to ‘inclusion’
that frame the ESA in official documents and the broader discourses that this article has
argued have evoked hostile emotions as part of the cultural basis for making out-of-
work benefits for disabled people harder to claim. In brief, the latter discourses are not
conducive to the ‘inclusion’ that the discourses of the former seem to want. If anything,
they are exclusionary. As Soldatic and Pini (2009: 83) argue in the case of Australia:
Disgust symbolises disability exclusion, where bodies are spatialised to minimise biological,
moral, cultural and social contamination. In a desire to minimise moral contagion, disability is
separated, excluded and then bounded outside the public sphere . . . disgust has been central to
the modern state and disability relations, particularly in regard to the way that states establish
classes of disability, where rights and entitlements are ‘attached’ accordingly.
Soldatic and Pini’s (2009) observations are important because they link notions of
disgust to access to benefits and services, in their words, to ‘where rights and entitlements
are “attached” accordingly’. However, the implication of Soldatic and Pini’s claim is that
the state is seeking to ‘separate’ or ‘exclude’ disabled people. We have seen, though,
that in Britain in official documents there seems to be concern with ‘including’, rather
than ‘excluding’, disabled people, albeit it in a narrow sense related to paid employment
(cf. Levitas, 1996, 1998). The tension here is that to effect change, such as the introduction
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of the ESA, the recipient group must in cultural terms be defined as being problematic, as
‘other’ (cf. Kemp, 2000; Garthwaite, 2011). However, the consequence, from the state’s
point of view, of that labelling process is hoped to be more positive, to result in more
people in paid work and, therefore, ‘included’.
In its material expression, this tension means the ESA should be understood as a
mechanism that acts to ‘sort’ disabled people into groups defined by their relationship to
paid work (Grover and Piggott, 2010). It is tempting to conclude that this is something
new, that what has been happening for many years to workless able-bodied people is
now being done to disabled people. However, what is actually being witnessed in late
modern society is a revisiting of what Stone (1984: 28) describes as the ‘formation of
disability as an administrative category’ that has a long and ignoble tradition in Britain
related in previous centuries to the operation of the poor laws. However, any approach
that encourages the location of the development of ESA in understandings of poor relief
carries the danger of encouraging an analysis that simply reproduces the arguably over-
used ‘deserving’/‘undeserving’ dichotomy.
The reason for getting away from this is that, at least at a discursive level, it is
very difficult to maintain the ‘deserving’/’undeserving’ dichotomy in the case of ESA. In
late modern society, and after 30 years of the individualisation of economic and social
problems, it is possible, following Chunn and Gavigan (2004), to argue that the recipients
of social security benefits, whether able-bodied or disabled, are never really considered
as ‘deserving’. To develop this point, it is arguably of more use to return to the basic
principles of poor relief, most notably that people should support themselves and should
not be disincentivised from doing so by collectivised interventions, particularly those
provided by the state. For people of working age, paid employment has been central to
this process and the purpose of the ‘disability category’ has been to distinguish between
those who could be considered unable to work and, therefore, could legitimately be
supported by the state and those who could be considered able to work and, therefore,
could not claim to require state-organised financial support. As Stone (1984: 28) notes:
Disability . . . even in its early incarnations as more specific conditions was seen to exist in
both genuine and artificial forms. People could be truly injured or feign injury. In the modern
understanding of disability, deception has become part and parcel of the concept itself, and
the nature of this deception is tied to the particular form of validation used to detect it. The
definition of disability and the means to determine it became critically linked.
It is the ability (or more precisely the alleged inability) of the state to distinguish
between those people who have what might be considered legitimate (and medicalised)
reasons for not working and those that do not that has framed disgust with disabled people
in late modern society and which has linked disgust to policy change. The concern was
that under the existing IB regime of income replacement benefits for disabled people,
those people who could support themselves through paid work had been able to absent
themselves from doing so through medical assessments that were too easy to pass (Grover
and Piggott, 2007). Both political and public discourses were structured by the assumption
that there were too many ‘feigners’ receiving such financial support.
In many senses, this focus upon the relationships between paid work, self sufficiency
and social security benefit support for disabled people draws upon a Benthamite
understanding of the role of collectivised versions of economic and social support. For
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Bentham, the only distinction to be made was between the independent poor (all those
who had to labour to secure their subsistence) and the indigent (those who were destitute
because they were unable to labour or even if they could labour were still in want) (see
Poynter, 1969). For Bentham, like recent governments in the UK, there were very few
people who could be considered incapable of working.3 The point of poor relief was to
prevent the independent poor from becoming indigent, to prevent the contamination of
worklessness. It is this focus upon paid work that is central to contemporary concerns
with disabled people. It is disgust with their worklessness that is the moral concern.
However, it is also the case that moral ordering related to paid work is often, at least at a
discursive level, related to disgust with disabled bodies. The disabled body is a screen on
to which fears about ‘dependency’, worklessness and economic decline are projected. It
is widely argued, for instance, that disability and disabled bodies have become metaphors
for economic and social problems:
On the one hand civic beauty, political consensus, social harmony, and economic vitality
summon images of the healthy body. On the other hand, whenever sickness, dirt, political
disagreement, social chaos, or economic depression appears, society responds by generating
images of the disabled or diseased body. (Siebers, 2003: 208)
As we have noted, such fears have material consequences. Nowhere is this more clear
in the contemporary redrawing of the ‘disability category’. This is because, rather than, as
the social model of disability might suggest, the focus being upon how disabled people
are prevented from working, the ESA (like IB before it) focuses upon the disabled body.
Those people whose bodies are judged the least capable of functioning like the ‘normal’
body are those that are separated to avoid contaminating the wider social order (Soldatic
and Meekosha, 2012). In terms of ‘inclusion’, this is problematic because those whose
bodies are adjudged as being incapable of working are separated into the Support Group
of ESA, where it is expected that they will have no contact with ‘included’, as denoted by
paid work, society. In this sense, the Support Group4 is a means of ‘excluding’, of hiding
away in the ‘disability category’ a need not to partake in the activity (paid work) that the
‘respectable’, the vast majority, are expected to do.
It is at this juncture that we see the difficulty in maintaining the ‘deserving’/
‘undeserving’ dichotomy, because ESA is concerned with sorting people presenting as
disabled into groups that are related to a judgement, informed by the ESA’s WCA (Grover
and Piggott, 2010), about their functional capability to do paid employment. None of these
groups can be considered to be ‘deserving’. The Support Group, as we have noted above,
is an administrative classification in which those people whose bodily functions are held
to make them furthest from labour markets are legitimately excluded from the one activity
(paid work) that policy elites suggest indicates ‘inclusion’ in society. Meanwhile, members
of the other groups (the ESA’s Work Related Activity Group and Job Seekers Allowance
(JSA) recipients), sorted according to the WCA, are, as the imposition of conditionality on
them demonstrates, viewed in policy with distrust. They are people who, in Stone’s (1984)
ideas, are thought to be feigning their inability to work by claiming they are disabled in
the case of the ESA’s Work Related Activity Group, or by claiming there is a lack of work
in the case of JSA recipients.
The idea, therefore, that ESA is concerned with ‘inclusion’ is a fallacy. It is about
ensuring that only those with what is judged at a particular moment to be a ‘true’ disability
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receive out-of-work benefits for disabled people. In this sense, it is concerned with re-
working the ‘disability category’ by making the qualifying criteria stricter and, therefore,
definingmore people as capable of working and ofmaking efforts to becomemore capable
of working. The aim has been ‘inclusion’, to make disabled people more like ‘respectable’
people: ‘hardworking’, ‘independent’ and ‘responsible’. However, this process, which
is better understood as the ‘responsibilising’ (see Rose, 1999) of disabled people, has
involved the use of exclusionary discourses and practices. To ‘include’ disabled people, it
would seem that their mediated stereotypes and the ways in which they are treated must
be felt by them as ‘exclusionary’ (cf. Roulstone, 2000).
Conc lus ion
In this article we have been concerned with relationships between the emotional and
material. We have examined the ways in which, through media and policy discourses
related to social security, hostile emotions towards workless disabled people are brought
to bear. This is having a real impact upon the ways in which such people are viewed
in society, as the almost constant association in such discourses is between chronic
ill-health and disability, and deviant attitudes and behaviours aimed at avoiding paid
work in preference for a life of ‘dependency’. In many senses, there is nothing new
about such concerns. Capitalism in Britain has for many years demanded a cheap and
expendable labour force and the able-bodied workless have suffered the consequences of
this (Welshman, 2006).What is perhaps new is the extension of the vitriol and opprobrium
that in the past was reserved for able-bodied unemployed people but which has been
extended to workless disabled people. The material basis of this seems not to matter, as
in contemporary society disabled people have become framed by hostile discourses in
periods of both economic expansion and in periods of economic crisis.
The effect of such discourses is deeply problematic for those people who can be
identified as disabled. As we have noted, there is a feeling among such people that
the existence of hostile emotions has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been accompanied by the
expression of hostility. The irony, however, is that the use of such emotions in discursive
practice is not particularly to ‘exclude’ disabled people further, but is to ‘include’ them.
The state does not want such people to be even more on the margins, where they are
likely to be costly to the welfare state. It wants them to be more like the ‘respectable’
(in work, ‘independent’, ‘responsible’) while the discourses and practice that frame such
concerns are actually felt as being exclusionary.
Notes
1 So, for example, in his speech to the 2010 Conservative Party conference, David Cameron argued
that: ‘Fairness means giving people what they deserve – and what people deserve depends on how they
behave. If you really cannot work, we’ll look after you. But if you can work, but refuse to work, we will
not let you live off the hard work of others’. As Garthwaite (2011: 370) points out, ‘it is the insertion of
“really” that belies scepticism about the truth of whether people really can or cannot work’, a scepticism
that she argues is particularly associated with disabled people.
2 http://www.mind.org.uk/campaigns_and_issues/policy_and_issues/making_benefits_fairer-
welfare_reform/the_daily_stigma [accessed 06.02.2012].
3 So, for example, Bentham (cited in Himmelfarb, 1970: 96) believed that: ‘Not one in a hundred is
absolutely incapable of all employment. Not the motion of a finger, not a step, not a wink, not a whisper,
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but might be turned to account in the way of profit in a system of such a magnitude . . . A bedridden person
if he can see and converse, may be fit for inspection; or though blind, if he can sit up in bed, may knit,
spin, etc. Real inability is relative only – i.e., with reference to this or that species of employment, or this
or that situation. In the situation in question employment may be afforded to every fragment of ability,
however minute. On the part of the deaf and dumb, and the blind, the situation is entire; requiring only to
be directed into particular channels. So, on the part of most classes of the insane, requiring only particular
means for the direction of it’ (ibid.).
4 The Support Group is made up of those individuals who ‘have a severe limitation which creates
a significant disability in relation to the labour market, regardless of any adaptation they may make or
support with which they may be provided’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009: 8).
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